Three dogmas of metaphysical methodology

Disputes are multiplied, as if every thing was uncertain; and these disputes are managed with the greatest warmth, as if every thing was certain. A puzzle about progress in philosophy In what does philosophical progress consist? Let us start by distinguishing, by attention to certain extrema, two ways in which progress in a given field might proceed. The first presupposes a single standard paradigm, accepted by most practitioners of the field, where by " paradigm " I have in mind what Kuhn (1962) called a " disciplinary matrix, " and what Carnap (1950/1956) called a " linguistic framework. " Paradigms, so understood, are not so much theories as frameworks for inquiry – ways of thinking about the subject matter, which include certain theoretical and methodological assumptions effectively treated as axiomatic or constitutive of the investigative approach at issue. Here progress consists mainly in constructing, refining, extending, exploring the consequences of, and testing theories within the constraints of, the preferred paradigm. Revolutions aside, such " vertical " progress, involving development of a single framework for theorizing, is characteristic of the sciences. Such common focus plausibly reflects that scientists are typically concerned to explore what is actually the case, so that their efforts are most efficiently expended within the framework(s) seen by their community as most likely to encode or otherwise model the way things actually are. Hence it is that when a given paradigm is ultimately deemed unworkable, it is replaced by a new paradigm – there is a shift from one preferred framework (or one restricted set of such frameworks) to another. A second, more ecumenical sort of progress consists in the identification and development of new paradigms – new ways of thinking about or engaging with the subject matter at issue. Conservatism aside, this sort of " horizontal " progress, involving the creative construction and development