Loftis • Germ-line Enhancement of Humans and Nonhumans

The current difference in attitude toward germ-line enhancement in humans and nonhumans is unjustified. Society should be more cautious in modifying the genes of nonhumans and more bold in thinking about modifying our own genome. I identify four classes of arguments pertaining to germ-line enhancement: safety arguments, justice arguments, trust arguments, and naturalness arguments. The first three types are compelling, but do not distinguish between human and nonhuman cases. The final class of argument would justify a distinction between human and nonhuman germ-line enhancement; however, this type of argument fails and, therefore, the discrepancy in attitude toward human and nonhuman germ-line enhancement is unjustified. People have widely disparate attitudes toward human and nonhuman genetic engineering. This discrepancy is clearest in North America. Most varieties of genetic intervention in humans receive attention in the popular press, are thoroughly analyzed by professional ethicists, and are approached by scientists with a great deal of caution. Meanwhile all kinds of genetic intervention in nonhumans, including genetic engineering, is proceeding on an industrial scale in North America with spotty notice in the popular press, little criticism from professional ethicists, and arguably little regulation by the government. Admittedly, many environmental groups have launched campaigns against genetically modified organisms (GMOs), but they have not captured the attention of the mainstream public. The situation is different in Europe, but even there one finds a discrepancy in attitude toward human and nonhuman genetic modification. Although there is opposition to the genetic engineering of nonhumans, the genetic engineering of humans is looked upon with genuine dread. 15.1loftis. 3/7/05, 3:26 PM 57 KENNEDY INSTITUTE OF ETHICS JOURNAL • MARCH 2005 [ 58 ] I argue that a serious examination of the risks and benefits of genetic technologies will show that this gap in attitude is unjustified. We should exercise far more caution in altering the genes of nonhumans, and be more bold in altering the genes of humans. I begin by outlining in more specific terms what technologies are in question, what moral distinctions are made, and what the prevailing attitudes are. I then divide the arguments typically brought against genetic engineering in humans and nonhumans into four classes: safety arguments, justice arguments, trust arguments, and naturalness arguments. I show that the first three classes of arguments are moderately effective. These cogent arguments signal a need for great caution and apply equally to humans and nonhumans. In the case of nonhuman genetic engineering, they signal a need for more caution than is currently being exercised in North America. Things are different when it comes to the “naturalness arguments.” These arguments, I believe, lie behind the difference in our treatment of human and nonhuman genetic engineering. People, especially Americans, feel the pull of naturalness arguments more strongly when it comes to humans. Moreover, this kind of argument generally leads to outright prohibition, rather than close regulation. The problem is that naturalness arguments all fail. No members of the class are cogent. I conclude that our policies towards genetic engineering need to be reshaped.