On the general argument against internalism
نویسنده
چکیده
I respond to John Greco’s argument that all forms of internalism in epistemology are either false or uninteresting. The paper divides into two sections. First, I explain precisely what internalists and externalists in epistemology disagree over. This puts us in a position to assess whether Greco’s argument succeeds. Second, I present Greco’s argument and offer two objections.
منابع مشابه
On the General Argument Against Internalism Forthcoming in Synthese
I respond to John Greco’s argument that all forms of internalism in epistemology are either false or uninteresting. The paper divides into two sections. First, I explain precisely what internalists and externalists in epistemology disagree over. This puts us in a position to assess whether Greco’s argument succeeds. Second, I present Greco’s argument and offer two objections. 1. Internalism and...
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Synthese
دوره 170 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2009