Coalition Formation in Simple Games: The Semistrict Core
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous share vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution of coalitional worth. Using a multiplicative composite solution, we induce players’ preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game, and present conditions under which the semistrict core of the game is nonempty. JEL Classification: D72, C71
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