The Coevolution of Morality and Legal Institutions

Evolutionary game theory is often used to analyze the evolution of moral preferences. A few studies also examine the coevolution of preferences and an institutional aspect of the decision environment. Allowing the adaptation of just one institutional aspect such as litigation or legal insurance to coevolve with morality, however, may be inadequate. If court rulings coevolve with morality the need for legal insurance may vary over time. Applying the indirect evolutionary approach, we therefore analyze the coevolution of morality in the sense of trustworthiness, court rulings (based on rational belief formation), and the population share which is legally insured. If type detection is not possible, the evolutionary interaction of the legal institutions may play a decisive role for the emergence of morality. * Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Strategic Interaction Unit, Kahlaische Straße 10, D07745 Jena, Germany; e-mail: [email protected] or [email protected]. Both authors gratefully thank Steffen Huck and Roland Kirstein for helpful comments, and gratefully acknowledge the support of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.