Finite State Equilibria in Dynamic Games
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چکیده
An equilibrium in an infinite horizon game is called a finite state equilibrium, if each player’s action on the equilibrium path is given by an automaton with a finite state space. We provide a complete characterization of this class of equilibria and provide a recursive computational method to check the equilibrium conditions. This encompasses the majority of existing works on repeated games with private monitoring.
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تاریخ انتشار 2007