Core Equivalence Theorems for Infinite Convex Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
We show that the core of a continuous convex game on a measurable space of players is a von Neumann Morgenstern stable set. We also extend the definition of the Mas Colell bargaining set to games with a measurable space of players and show that for continuous convex games the core may be strictly included in the bargaining set but it coincides with the set of all countably additive payoff measures in the bargaining set. We provide examples which show that the continuity assumption is essential to our results. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71. 1997 Academic Press
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