Selecting Equilibria using Best-Response Dynamics
نویسنده
چکیده
I propose a simple simulation procedure for large games with multiple equilibria. The simulation procedure is based on a best-response dynamic. The implied equilibrium selection mechanism is intuitive: more stable equilibria are selected with higher probability. JEL Codes: C62, C72, C73
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