Applying Copeland Voting to Design an Agent-Based Hyper-Heuristic
نویسندگان
چکیده
Meta-heuristics are algorithms which are applied to solve problems when conventional algorithms can not find good solutions in reasonable time; evolutionary algorithms are perhaps the most well-known examples of meta-heuristics. As there are many possible meta-heuristics, finding the most suitable meta-heuristic for a given problem is not a trivial task. In order to make this choice, one can design hyperheuristics. In the literature, one can find some agent-based research whose focus is to propose a framework where metaheuristics are considered as agents, that solve a given problem in a collaborative or competitive way. Most of these works focus on mono-objective meta-heuristics. Other works focus on how to select multi-objective meta-heuristics, but not using an agent-based approach. We present in this work an agent-based hyper-heuristic for choosing the most suitable evolutionary meta-heuristic for a given problem. Our approach performs a cooperative Copeland voting procedure, considering five different metrics, to define which one of three competitive evolutionary meta-heuristics should execute during a certain processing time. We use the Walking Fish Problem (WFG) suite with two and three objectives to analyse the proposed approach performance. The obtained results showed that in all cases our strategy found the most indicated evolutionary algorithm and gets competitive results against the state of art.
منابع مشابه
The control complexity of sincere strategy preference based approval voting and of fallback voting, and a study of optimal lobbying and Junta distributions for SAT
While voting systems were originally used in political science, they are now also of central importance in various areas of computer science, such as artificial intelligence (in particular within multiagent systems). Brams and Sanver [BS06] introduced sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting (SP-AV) and fallback voting (FV), two election systems which combine the preference rankings of...
متن کاملCopeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control
Control and bribery are settings in which an external agent seeks to influence the outcome of an election. Faliszewski et al. [7] proved that Llull voting (which is here denoted by Copeland) and a variant (here denoted by Copeland) of Copeland voting are computationally resistant to many, yet not all, types of constructive control and that they also provide broad resistance to bribery. We study...
متن کاملar X iv : 0 71 1 . 47 59 v 1 [ cs . G T ] 2 9 N ov 2 00 7 Copeland Voting Fully
Control and bribery are settings in which an external agent seeks to influence the outcome of an election. Faliszewski et al. [7] proved that Llull voting (which is here denoted by Copeland) and a variant (here denoted by Copeland) of Copeland voting are computationally resistant to many, yet not all, types of constructive control and that they also provide broad resistance to bribery. We study...
متن کاملA cooperative hyper-heuristic search framework
In this paper, we aim to investigate the role of cooperation between low level heuristics within a hyper-heuristic framework. Since different low level heuristics have different strengths and weaknesses, we believe that cooperation can allow the strengths of one low level heuristic to compensate for the weaknesses of another. We propose an agent-based cooperative hyper-heuristic framework compo...
متن کاملLlull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
Control and bribery are settings in which an external agent seeks to influence the outcome of an election. Constructive control of elections refers to attempts by an agent to, via such actions as addition/deletion/partition of candidates or voters, ensure that a given candidate wins. Destructive control refers to attempts by an agent to, via the same actions, preclude a given candidate’s victor...
متن کامل