Continuous fictitious play via projective geometry
نویسنده
چکیده
Using insights from the theory of projective geometry one can prove convergence of continuous fictitious play in a certain class of games. As a corollary, we obtain a kind of equilibrium selection result, whereby continuous fictitious play converges to a particular equilibrium contained in a continuum of equivalent equilibria for symmetric 4×4 zero-sum games. Journal of Economic Literature classification numbers: C72.
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تاریخ انتشار 2002