Deterrence of Corporate Fraud through Securities Litigation: the Role of Institutional Investors

نویسنده

  • KEITH L. JOHNSON
چکیده

Securities class action lawsuits just might be the schizophrenic stepchildren of our civil litigation system. They are expected to serve two masters at the same time. The first is the goal of obtaining compensation for wronged investors who have suffered losses at the hands of corporate wrongdoers. The second is filling the role of private attorneys general to sanction violators and deter future misconduct. There is often a tension between these two masters. Approaches that provide the most effective deterrence of future fraud may not necessarily provide the largest loss recovery.

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تاریخ انتشار 1998