Brodmann ’ s Brain Mapping and Multiple Realization

Some forty years ago, Hilary Putnam offered the speculative empirical hypothesis that psychological states are multiply realized in brain states. With the subsequent explosive growth in neuroscientific research, it is only natural that philosophers have begun to examine Putnam's empirical speculation in the light of this research. 1 To meet the restrictions of a short conference presentation, I will consider one component of this recent attention. William Bechtel and Jennifer Mundale (1997, 1999), have suggested that Brodmann's brain mapping research challenges Putnam's hypothesis. I find, however, that this research does not have the dire consequences for multiple realization that Bechtel and Mundale allege. The centerpiece of Bechtel and Mundale's treatment of brain mapping and multiple realization is the following argument: Two aspects of these [neuroanatomical] practices will be especially noteworthy: (1) the appeal to function, especially psychological function, is an essential part of both the project and its tools, and (2) the cartographic project itself is frequently carried out comparatively–across species. For multiple realization to be a serious option, brain taxonomy would have to be carried out both independently of psychological function, and without comparative evaluation across species In order to make a relatively simple paper that fits within the confines of a conference presentation, I propose to refine Bechtel and Mundale's central argument to the following: 1. If multiple realization of psychological function were true, then neuroanatomy would have to be carried out independently of psychological function and without comparative evaluation across species. 2. Neuroanatomy cannot be carried out independently of psychological function. 3. Neuroanatomy uses comparative evaluation across species. ===