Output and R&D subsidies in a mixed oligopoly
نویسندگان
چکیده
We analyze an oligopoly where public and private firms compete in quantity and R&D. Using general functions, we show that an output subsidy and an R&D tax can achieve the first-best allocation. Moreover, the degree of privatization does not influence the optimal output subsidy but does influence the optimal R&D tax. JEL Classification: H42; L13; L32;
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Oper. Res. Lett.
دوره 45 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2017