Game theoretical solution concepts for learning agents with extensive–form games
نویسنده
چکیده
My Ph.D thesis focuses on the study of solution concepts for rational learning agents in extensive–form games in absence of common knowledge; specifically, on the definition of solution concepts, their search, analysis of static and dynamic property, characterization of learning dynamics. Summarily, my work is finalized to better understand how to integrate more thoroughly game theory and machine learning.
منابع مشابه
Strategy Effectiveness of Game-Theoretical Solution Concepts in Extensive-Form General-Sum Games
Game theory describes the conditions for the strategies of rational agents to form an equilibrium. However, game theory can fail from the prescriptive viewpoint and can serve only as a heuristic recommendation for agents. There exists a plethora of game theoretic solution concepts, however, their effectiveness has never been compared; hence, there is no guideline for selecting correct algorithm...
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