E¢ cient Repeated Implementation I: Complete Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper examines repeatedly implementing a social choice function in a general complete information environment where agents are in nitely-lived and their preferences are determined stochastically in each period. We rst demonstrate a necessary role that e¢ ciency plays for repeated implementation. We then establish how any e¢ cient social choice function can be repeatedly implemented in Nash equilibrium. JEL Classi cation: A13, C72, C73, D78
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