The emergence of commitments and cooperation
نویسندگان
چکیده
Our results suggest that human specialized capacity for commitment, which might have been shaped by natural selection, consists in a capacity for managing to impose a high cost of punishment at a relatively small cost. References. [1] Nesse. Evolution and the Capacity for Commitment. Russell Sage Foundation, 2001. [2] Axelrod. The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books, 1984. [3] Han.et.al. Intention recognition promotes the emergence of cooperation. Adaptive Behavior 2011. [4] Sigmund. The Calculus of Selfishness. Princeton U.P, 2010. ▪ Using Evolutionary Game Theory, we describe a model showing the co-evolution of commitments and cooperation in one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma. ▪ Our results show that cooperation can emerge if the punishment cost for defaulting on commitments is large enough compared to the cost of arranging them.
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تاریخ انتشار 2012