How cognitive neuroscience could be more biological—and what it might learn from clinical neuropsychology

Three widespread assumptions of Cognitive-affective Neuroscience are discussed: first, mental functions are assumed to be localized in circumscribed brain areas which can be exactly determined, at least in principle (localizationism). Second, this assumption is associated with the more general claim that these functions (and dysfunctions, such as in neurological or mental diseases) are somehow generated inside the brain (internalism). Third, these functions are seen to be "biological" in the sense that they can be decomposed and finally explained on the basis of elementary biological causes (i.e., genetic, molecular, neurophysiological etc.), causes that can be identified by experimental methods as the gold standard (isolationism). Clinical neuropsychology is widely assumed to support these tenets. However, by making reference to the ideas of Kurt Goldstein (1878-1965), one of its most important founders, I argue that none of these assumptions is sufficiently supported. From the perspective of a clinical-neuropsychological practitioner, assessing and treating brain damage sequelae reveals a quite different picture of the brain as well as of us "brain carriers", making the organism (or person) in its specific environment the crucial reference point. This conclusion can be further elaborated: all experimental and clinical research on humans presupposes the notion of a situated, reflecting, and interacting subject, which precedes all kinds of scientific decomposition, however useful. These implications support the core assumptions of the embodiment approach to brain and mind, and, as I argue, Goldstein and his clinical-neuropsychological observations are part of its very origin, for both theoretical and historical reasons.