Normative Practical Reasoning

1. Instrumental reasoning. Aristotle identified practical reasoning as reasoning that concludes in an act, and he was thinking of a non-mental act such as tasting food. But reasoning is a mental process, which takes place in the reasoner's mind. Its conclusion must be a mental state or a mental event; it cannot be a non-mental act. I therefore identify practical reasoning as reasoning that concludes in an intention, which is a mental state. This is as practical as reasoning can get. When reasoning concludes in an intention to act, the intention is in turn likely to cause the intended act. But that last bit of causation is not part of the reasoning process. One can intend many things besides acts. For example, one can intend to be alert, or to be asked to join the club. I shall call reasoning practical if it concludes in an intention of any sort, not just an intention to act. So in one way my notion of practical reasoning is wider than Aristotle's. This paper is about one particular sort of practical reasoning, which I shall call 'normative'. Normative practical reasoning sets out from a normative belief – a belief in a normative proposition – and concludes in an intention. However, I need to do some preliminary work. Many philosophers think that reasoning must conclude in a belief; it cannot conclude in an intention. They doubt the existence of practical reasoning as I understand it. In view of this widespread scepticism, I shall start by offering an example of practical reasoning that seems to me incontrovertible, and explain how it works. Since this is only a preliminary to my discussion of normative practical reasoning, my argument here will be sketchy and leave gaps. I have closed some of the gaps in another article. 1 Here is the example: I am going to leave the next buoy to starboard and In order to leave the next buoy to starboard, I must tack, so I shall tack. In this piece of reasoning, the first and third sentences express intentions, and the second a belief. You might go through this reasoning while approaching the next buoy. You already intend to leave it to starboard. When the wind shifts, you acquire the belief that you must tack in order to do so. Reasoning then leads you to form the intention of tacking. Your reasoning takes you from two …