Identifying combinatorial valuations from aggregate demand
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study identification of combinatorial valuations from aggregate demand. Each utility function takes as arguments subsets or, alternatively, quantities of the multiple goods. We exploit mathematical insights from auction theory to generically identify the distribution of utility functions. In our setting, aggregate demand for each item is observable while demand for bundles is not. Nevertheless, our identification result allows us to recover the latter.
منابع مشابه
Online Appendix for “Identifying Combinatorial Valuations from Aggregate Demand”
This Online Appendix addresses several issues mentioned but not discussed in depth in the paper. Section I discusses various extensions of the basic model. Section II shows that for our identification arguments, it is sufficient to observe aggregate demand where it is singlevalued. Section III provides a proof of part 3 of Proposition 4. Section IV provides an example that shows that the set of...
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 153 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2014