Do Firms Adjust to a Target Board Structure ? ?
نویسندگان
چکیده
We examine whether firms pursue target board structures. Using a broad panel from 1991–2003, we find that board changes are frequent, with two-thirds of firms changing board size or independence during a two-year period. Board changes are associated with changes in firm-specific fundamentals. The rate of change is positively associated with the benefits of effective boards and negatively associated with CEO influence. Firms change board characteristics in either direction as underlying firm fundamentals change, consistent with the pursuit of economically efficient targets. JEL Classification: D23; G34; G38; K22; M14
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