Reason-based choice correspondences
نویسنده
چکیده
A reason-based choice correspondence rationalizes choice behaviour in terms of a two-stage choice procedure. Given a feasible set S, the individual eliminates from it all of the dominated alternatives according to her xed (not necessarily complete) strict preference relation, in the rst step. In the second step, rst she constructs for each maximal alternative identi ed in the rst step its lower contour set (i.e., the set of alternatives which are dominated by it in S), and then she eliminates from the maximal set all of those alternatives so that the following justi cation holds: there exists another maximal alternative whose lower contour set strictly contains that of another maximal alternative. This procedural model captures the basic idea behind the experimental nding known as "attraction e¤ect". We study the rationalizability of reason-based choice correspondences axiomatically. We relate our choice-consistency conditions to standard consistency proprieties. Our characterization result o¤ers testable restrictions on this choice anomalyfor large (but nite) set of alternatives. J.E.L. codes: D0.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Mathematical Social Sciences
دوره 57 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2009