Rational action without knowledge (and vice versa)

It has been recently argued that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. A way of formulating this norm is the following bi-conditional: it is rational to treat p as a reason for acting if and only if you know that p. In my talk, I provide three new counterexamples to this claim. I show cases of rational action: i) motivated by imagining, ii) grounded in acceptance, and iii) performed in sceptical scenarios in which knowledge is absent. These three types of cases constitute objections to the left-to-right direction of the bi-conditional: it is shown that it is appropriate for a subject to act as if p even if she does not believe (and thus does not know) that p. Furthermore, I suggest that the first two are also counterexamples to the right-to-left direction of the bi-conditional: it is shown that one can know that p but that it is inappropriate for her to treat p as a reason for acting.