Human Strategic Reasoning in Dynamic Games: Experiments, Logics, Cognitive Models

نویسندگان

  • Sujata Ghosh
  • Tamoghna Halder
  • Khyati Sharma
  • Rineke Verbrugge
چکیده

This article provides a three-way interaction between experiments, logic and cognitive modelling so as to bring out a shared perspective among these diverse areas, aiming towards better understanding and better modelling of human strategic reasoning in dynamic games.

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تاریخ انتشار 2015