IZA Discussion Paper No. 844
نویسنده
چکیده
On the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes By enriching a principal-agent model it is shown that the introduction of monetary incentives may reduce an agent’s motivation. In a first step, we allow for the possibility that some agents stick to unverifiable agreements. The larger the fraction of reliable agents, the lower powered will then be the optimal incentive scheme and fixed wages become optimal when performance measurement is costly. If social norms matter such that some agents’ reliability is influenced by their beliefs on the convictions of others, high powered incentives signal that not sticking to agreements is a widespread behavior and may lead to lower effort levels. JEL Classification: M52, J33, D23
منابع مشابه
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This Discussion Paper is issued within the framework of IZA's research area 7KHH:HOIDUH6WDWHH DQG/DERUU0DUNHWVAny opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the institute. Research disseminated by IZA may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual in...
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