Integration, Regulation, Lobbying by Firms and Workers, and Technological Change
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper examines an economic union where oligopolistic firms produce by skilled and unskilled labor and do R&D by skilled labor. The planner of the union accepts new members to the union, deregulates the product market through anti-trust policy and regulates the labor market through a minimum wage for unskilled labor. Firms and workers lobby the planner for prospective policy. It is shown that in the political equilibrium small unions apply product market deregulation, but large unions labor market deregulation. When an economic union grows, it will replace regulation by deregulation in the labor market. Journal of Economic Literature: F15, J50, O40
منابع مشابه
Economic Integration, Lobbying by Firms and Workers, and Technological Change
I examine a common market with the following institutions. Oligopolistic firms improve their productivity by R&D. Wages are determined by union-employer bargaining. Firms and workers lobby the authority that accepts new members and regulates unions’ and firms’ market power. The main findings are as follows. Small common markets have incentives to expand, but large ones are indifferent to new me...
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