Fixation in Evolutionary Games under Non-Vanishing Selection
نویسندگان
چکیده
One of the most striking effect of fluctuations in evolutionary game theory is the possibility for mutants to fixate (take over) an entire population. Here, we generalize a recent WKB-based theory to study fixation in evolutionary games under non-vanishing selection, and investigate the relation between selection intensity w and demographic (random) fluctuations. This allows the accurate treatment of large fluctuations and yields the probability and mean times of fixation beyond the weak selection limit. The power of the theory is demonstrated on prototypical models of cooperation dilemmas with multiple absorbing states. Our predictions compare excellently with numerical simulations and, for finite w, significantly improve over those of the Fokker-Planck approximation.
منابع مشابه
Abstract Submitted for the MAR11 Meeting of The American Physical Society Large fluctuations and fixation in evolutionary games
Submitted for the MAR11 Meeting of The American Physical Society Large fluctuations and fixation in evolutionary games MICHAEL ASSAF, MAURO MOBILIA — One of the most striking effects of fluctuations in evolutionary game theory is the possibility for mutants to fixate (take over) an entire population. In this work we use a semi-classical theory to study fixation in evolutionary games under non-v...
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