Market Inefficiency , Insurance Mandate and Welfare : U . S . Health Care Reform 2010
نویسندگان
چکیده
This is supplementary document accompanies Jung and Tran (2010) and covers material that is not included in the paper due to space constraints. JEL Classification:
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