Signaling in a Global Game: Coordination and Policy Traps∗ George-Marios Angeletos
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper examines the role of policy in coordination environments such as currency crises and bank runs by introducing signaling in a global game. While exogenous asymmetric information has been shown to select a unique equilibrium, we show that the endogenous information generated by policy interventions leads to multiple equilibria. Multiplicity obtains even in environments where the policy is observed with idiosyncratic noise. It is sustained by the agents coordinating on different interpretations of, and different reactions to, the same policy choices. The policy maker is thus trapped into a position where self-fulfilling expectations dictate not only the coordination outcome but also the optimal policy. JEL Classification Numbers: C7, D8, E5, E6, F3.
منابع مشابه
Preempting Speculative Attacks Robust Predictions in a Global Game with Multiple Equilibria∗ George-Marios Angeletos MIT and NBER
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متن کاملOnline Appendix for Signaling in a Global Game: Coordination and Policy Traps
Lemma 2. For any r∗ ∈ (r, r̃) and ε > 0, there exist η̄ > 0 and ρ̄ < r/r∗ such that for any (η, ρ) < (η̄, ρ̄), conditions (3)-(2) below admit a solution (x0, x̂, θ0, θ00) that satisfies θ0 ≤ θ00, |x0 − x∗| < ε, ̄̄θ0 − θ∗ ̄̄ < ε, ̄̄θ00 − θ∗∗ ̄̄ < ε, and x̂ < −1/ε. 1−Ψ(x−θ σ ) = r − (r − ρr∗)[Ψ(x 0−θ0 σ )−Ψ(x 0−θ00 σ )] (1) 1−Ψ( x̂−θ0 σ ) = r + [r∗ρ+ r∗(1− ρ) exp( r ∗−r η )− r][Ψ( x̂−θ 0 σ )−Ψ( x̂−θ 00 σ )] (2) θ0...
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