Essentially Incomplete Descriptions

In this paper I offer a defence of a Russellian analysis of the referential uses of incomplete (mis) descriptions, in a contextual setting. With regard to descriptions (introduction), I will support the former against the latter. In 1. I explain what I mean by “essentially” incomplete descriptions: incomplete descriptions are context dependent descriptions. In 2. I examine one of the best versions of the and Ostertag. I then show that this proposal seems unable to treat the normal uses of misdescriptions. I then accept the challenge of treating misdescriptions as a key to solving the problem of context dependent explain misdescriptions. In 4. I suggest an alternative what a speaker should have in mind in using certain words in a certain context and (ii) what a normal a common basic knowledge of the lexicon. In 5. I (partiality, perspective and approximation) as a means of representing the role of pragmatics as a procedural approach against possible objections concerning the problem of the boundaries between semantics and pragmatics, relying on the distinction between semantics and theory of meaning.1