Philosophical perspectives on ad hoc hypotheses and the Higgs mechanism

We examine physicists’ charge of adhocness against the Higgs mechanism in the Standard Model of elementary particle physics. We argue that even though this charge never rested on a clear-cut and well-entrenched definition of “ad hoc”, it is based on conceptual and methodological assumptions and principles which are well-founded elements of the scientific practice of high-energy particle physics. Based on our findings, we dispute the claim made by Christopher Hunt in a recent article in Philosophy of Science that the use of “ad hoc” by scientists reflects nothing more substantial than a judgment made on the basis of their “individual aesthetic senses”. We further evaluate the implications of the recent discovery of a Higgs-like particle at the CERN Large Hadron Collider for the charge of adhocness against the Higgs mechanism. “Of course our model has too many arbitrary features for these predictions to be taken very seriously [...]” (Weinberg 1967, p. 1265)