A Physicist’s Reformed Critique of Nonreductive Physicalism and Emergence1

نویسنده

  • Arnold E. Sikkema
چکیده

For millenia, people have been asking questions such as “What is the world made of?” and “What are its most fundamental components?” The Greek philosopher Democritus (c. 470-380 B.C.) postulated an atomic theory which held that indivisible particles constitute all of matter, but it wasn’t until the nineteenth century that this theory received any empirical support (even though indivisibility remains unsupported). This support was given in botanist Robert Brown’s 1827 observations of apparently random motion of pollen grains in water, as explained in Albert Einstein’s 1905 application of James Clerk Maxwell’s and Ludwig Boltzmann’s 1860 kinetic theory of gases, a clear example of the interplay of observation, theory, and experiment basic to physics. In the hundred years following Einstein’s annus mirabilis,2 physicists have learned that most matter is made of nuclei and electrons, that nuclei are made of neutrons and protons, that these are made of quarks, and that quarks and electrons, though possibly indivisible, may “simply” be special modes of oscillations of yet more fundamental “strings.” Brown, Maxwell, Boltzmann, and Einstein worked in the context of the success of modern (Newtonian) science, which by means of abstraction and empirical studies optimistically de-mystified much of the world into tidy physical explanations in mathematical language. While scientific developments of the past few centuries represent significant progress toward obedience to the cultural mandate3 and the manifestations of Christ’s lordship and restoration of life and the cosmos, a dark side has presented itself as well. This was the slow but steady growth of reductionism, as majority elements of both the scientific community and the general public under its influence developed a point of view that brain physiologist Donald MacKay calls “nothing-buttery”: there is nothing in the universe but particles and interactions.4 Among the most vocal and dogmatic is Nobel prize-winning theoretical physicist Steven Weinberg, who rebuts moral philosopher Mary Midgley’s claim that statements like “George was allowed home from prison at last on Sunday” cannot be explained in the language of physics by saying, apart from historical accidents that by definition cannot be explained, the nervous systems of George and his friends have evolved to what they are entirely because of the principles of macroscopic physics and chemistry, Editor’s Note: Two figures are included. Dr. Sikkema has obtained permission from the first author of the paper from which Fig. 2 is adapted, as well as from the publisher.

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تاریخ انتشار 2005