Individual Rationality in Collective Choice
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper studies the rationality of an individual player in sequential games of perfect information played with other players who are not necessarily rational. The paper proposes a set of properties on the choice behavior and shows that they are equivalent to the rationality of an individual player at the initial node independently of the behavioral norm of the other players. Furthermore, I show that the choice of subgame perfect equilibrium paths is obtained as a special case where all players involved in the environment are individually rational. Therefore, the paper offers a testable condition both for individual rationality and collective rationality in sequential games. JEL Classification: C72, D70.
منابع مشابه
Lifting Rationality Assumptions in Binary Aggregation
We consider problems where several individuals each need to make a yes/no choice regarding a number of issues and these choices then need to be aggregated into a collective choice. Depending on the application at hand, different combinations of yes/no may be considered rational. We can describe such rationality assumptions in terms of a propositional formula. The question then arises whether or...
متن کاملCollective Rationality and Social Choice
Arrow’s impossibility theorem states that if a collective choice rule satisfies unrestricted domain, weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and collective rationality, then there exists a dictator. Among others, Arrow’s postulate of collective rationality is controversial. We propose a new axiom for a collective choice rule, decisiveness coherence, which is weaker than collective...
متن کاملLifting integrity constraints in binary aggregation
We consider problems in which several individuals each need to make a yes/no choice regarding a number of issues and these choices then need to be aggregated into a collective choice. Depending on the application at hand, different combinations of yes/no may be considered rational. We describe rationality assumptions as integrity constraints using a simple propositional language and we explore ...
متن کاملA Behavioral Arrow Theorem
In light of research indicating that individual behavior may violate standard rationality assumptions, we introduce a model of preference aggregation in which neither individual nor collective preferences must satisfy transitivity or other coherence conditions. We introduce an ordinal rationality measure to compare preference relations in terms of their level of coherence. Using this measure, w...
متن کاملArrow’s Theorem Without Transitivity
In light of research indicating that individual behavior may violate standard rationality assumptions, we introduce a model of preference aggregation in which neither individual nor collective preferences must satisfy transitivity or other coherence conditions. We introduce an ordinal rationality measure to compare preference relations. Using this measure, we introduce a new axiom, monotonicity...
متن کامل