From Nash to Cournot-Nash equilibria via the Monge-Kantorovich problem.
نویسندگان
چکیده
The notion of Nash equilibria plays a key role in the analysis of strategic interactions in the framework of N player games. Analysis of Nash equilibria is however a complex issue when the number of players is large. In this article, we emphasize the role of optimal transport theory in (i) the passage from Nash to Cournot-Nash equilibria as the number of players tends to infinity and (ii) the analysis of Cournot-Nash equilibria.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Philosophical transactions. Series A, Mathematical, physical, and engineering sciences
دوره 372 2028 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2014