Are Smarter Groups More Cooperative? Evidence from Prisoner’s Dilemma
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چکیده
Are more intelligent groups better at cooperating? A meta-study of repeated prisoner’s dilemma experiments run at numerous universities suggests that students cooperate 5% to 8% more often for every 100 point increase in the school’s average SAT score. This result survives a variety of robustness tests. Axelrod (1984) recommends that the way to create cooperation is to encourage players to be patient and perceptive; experimental evidence suggests that more intelligent groups implicitly follow this advice.
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Are Smarter Groups More Cooperative? Evidence from Prisoner’s Dilemma Experiments, 1959-2003
Are more intelligent groups better at cooperating? A meta-study of repeated prisoner’s dilemma experiments run at numerous universities suggests that students cooperate 5% to 8% more often for every 100 point increase in the school’s average SAT score. This result survives a variety of robustness tests. Axelrod (1984) recommends that the way to create cooperation is to encourage players to be p...
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