Evolutionary stability for large populations.

نویسنده

  • Daniel B Neill
چکیده

We present a revision of Maynard Smith's evolutionary stability criteria for populations which are very large (though technically finite) and of unknown size. We call this the large population ESS, as distinct from Maynard Smith's infinite population ESS and Schaffer's finite population ESS. Building on Schaffer's finite population model, we define the large population ESS as a strategy which cannot be invaded by any finite number of mutants, as long as the population size is sufficiently large. The large population ESS is not equivalent to the infinite population ESS: we give examples of games in which a large population ESS exists but an infinite population ESS does not, and vice versa. Our main contribution is a simple set of two criteria for a large population ESS, which are similar (but not identical) to those originally proposed by Maynard Smith for infinite populations.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Stationary Stability for Evolutionary Dynamics in Finite Populations

We demonstrate a vast expansion of the theory of evolutionary stability to finite populations with mutation, connecting the theory of the stationary distribution of the Moran process with the Lyapunov theory of evolutionary stability. We define the notion of stationary stability for the Moran process with mutation and generalizations, as well as a generalized notion of evolutionary stability th...

متن کامل

Stochasticity and evolutionary stability.

In stochastic dynamical systems, different concepts of stability can be obtained in different limits. A particularly interesting example is evolutionary game theory, which is traditionally based on infinite populations, where strict Nash equilibria correspond to stable fixed points that are always evolutionarily stable. However, in finite populations stochastic effects can drive the system away...

متن کامل

A tradeoff between the ecological and evolutionary stabilities of public goods genes in microbial populations

Microbial populations often rely on the cooperative production of extracellular " public goods " molecules. The cooperative nature of public good production may lead to minimum viable population sizes, below which populations collapse. In addition, " cooperator " public goods producing cells face evolutionary competition from non-producing mutants, or " freeloaders ". Thus, public goods coopera...

متن کامل

A new approach on studying the stability of evolutionary game dynamics for financial systems

‎Financial market modeling and prediction is a difficult problem and drastic changes of the price causes nonlinear dynamic that makes the price prediction one of the most challenging tasks for economists‎. ‎Since markets always have been interesting for traders‎, ‎many traders with various beliefs are highly active in a market‎. ‎The competition among two agents of traders‎, ‎namely trend follo...

متن کامل

Evolutionary and convergence stability for continuous phenotypes in finite populations derived from two-allele models.

The evolution of a quantitative phenotype is often envisioned as a trait substitution sequence where mutant alleles repeatedly replace resident ones. In infinite populations, the invasion fitness of a mutant in this two-allele representation of the evolutionary process is used to characterize features about long-term phenotypic evolution, such as singular points, convergence stability (establis...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:
  • Journal of theoretical biology

دوره 227 3  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2004