A defense of the neglected rhetorical strategy (NRS).

PHILOSOPHICAL CRITICISM serves a valuable end when it helps to clarify the truth. But clarity requires precision. Precision is especially necessary when one presents the arguments of those holding the view that is the focus of one’s criticisms. Where there is lack of precision, ambiguity and confusion may arise, which may in turn obscure the truth. For this reason I was deeply disturbed by the inaccurate portrayal of my work and arguments (and the parallel arguments of Frederica Mathewes-Green and Paul Swope) in a recently published paper by Francis Beckwith. Beckwith begins with a description of the traditional pro-life strategy, for which he has been an advocate, that is centered on the moral argument against the unjust killing of innocent humans beings. Beckwith’s argument is simple: since abortion destroys an innocent human life, abortion should be prohibited. I do not contest it. Beckwith, on the other hand, does object to the reasoning and arguments of Mathewes-Green, Swope, and myself, who also seek to identify women as victims of abortion, an approach that he has labeled the “new rhetorical strategy (NRS).” The novel acronym NRS is less descriptive than the pro-woman/pro-life label that I prefer, but for the purpose of responding to Beckwith’s criticisms I will employ it in this paper.