A Combinatorial Auction with Multiple Winners for Universal Service
نویسندگان
چکیده
We describe a discrete-time auction procedure called PAUSE (Progressive Adaptive User Selection Environment) for use in assigning COLR (Carrier of Last Resort) responsibility for universal service. The auction incorporates synergies by permitting all combinatorial bids, is transparent to the bidders, allows for multiple winners, and minimizes the possibility of bidder collusion. The procedure is computationally tractable for the auctioneer and thus is very efficient to run. The inherent computational complexity of combinatorial bidding cannot be eliminated. However, in this auction the computational burden of evaluating synergies rests with the bidders claiming those synergies, while the auctioneer simply checks that a bid is valid. (Auctions; Combinatorial Bidding; Universal Service; Carrier of Last Resort; Telecommunications; Synergies)
منابع مشابه
Selecting Efficient Service-providers in Electric Power Distribution Industry Using Combinatorial Reverse Auction
In this paper, a combinatorial reverse auction mechanism is proposed for selecting the most efficient service-providers for resolving sustained power interruptions in multiple regions of an electric power distribution company’s responsibility area. Through this mechanism, supplying the required service in each region is assigned to only one potential service-provider considering two criteria in...
متن کاملProxy Agent for Combinatorial Reverse Auction with Multiple Buyers
Although combinatorial reverse auction has attracted much attention recently, most studies focus on problems with single buyer and multiple sellers. In this paper, we will study combinatorial reverse auction with multiple buyers and multiple sellers. We propose the concept of proxy buyer to deal with this problem. The proxy buyer consolidates the demands from the buyers and then holds a reverse...
متن کاملFair Payments for Efficient Allocations in Public Sector Combinatorial Auctions
Motivated by the increasing use of auctions by government agencies, we consider the problem of fairly pricing public goods in a combinatorial auction. A well-known problem with the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction mechanism is that the resulting prices may not be in the core. Loosely speaking, this means the payments of the winners could be so low, that there are losing ...
متن کاملA Multi-attribute Reverse Auction Framework Under Uncertainty to the Procurement of Relief Items
One of the main activities of humanitarian logistics is to provide relief items for survivors in case of a disaster. To facilitate the procurement operation, this paper proposes a bidding framework for supplier selection and optimal allocation of relief items. The proposed auction process is divided into the announcement construction, bid construction and bid evaluation phases. In the announcem...
متن کاملSingle Item Auctions with Discrete Action Spaces
An implicit assumption in truthful mechanism design is that revelation of one’s true type is always feasible. Indeed, this is not a problem in standard mechanism design setups, where it is up to the designer to determine the action spaces. However, this assumption fails to hold in many practical scenarios, where there are natural, exogenous constraints on the set of possible actions. For exampl...
متن کامل