Merger Efficiency and Managerial Incentives
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bank Mergers , the Market for Bank CEOs , and Managerial Incentives *
Compensation of bank CEOs increases after mergers, suggesting that executives may engage in acquisitions to enjoy size-related personal benefits (Bliss and Rosen, 2001). Alternatively, bank mergers can be viewed as the efficient assignation of merged assets to the managerial team best suited to realize merger gains. Theories of executive compensation based on managerial productivity and optimal...
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