Local equilibria in economic games
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study solution concepts for economic games that are resistant to local deviations. Strategy spaces are l subsets of R and local deviations are small in the Euclidean metric. We define local Nash equilibrium and local evolutionarily stable strategy, and present applications to Walrasian outcomes in Cournot games and separating outcomes in screening models. 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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