Oscillations in Rational Economies

نویسنده

  • Yuriy Mishchenko
چکیده

Economic (business) cycles are some of the most noted features of market economies, also ranked among the most serious of economic problems. Despite long historical persistence, the nature and the origin of business cycles remain controversial. In this paper we investigate the problem of the nature of business cycles from the positions of the market systems viewed as complex systems of many interacting market agents. We show that the development of cyclic instabilities in these settings can be traced down to just two fundamental factors - the competition of market agents for market shares in the settings of an open market, and the depression of market caused by accumulation of durable overproduced commodities on the market. These findings present the problem of business cycles in a new light as a systemic property of efficient market systems emerging directly from the free market competition itself, and existing in market economies at a very fundamental level.

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عنوان ژورنال:

دوره 9  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2014