Does Nash Envy Immunity

نویسنده

  • Ching-Hua Yu
چکیده

In general, the outcome of games can deviate from the predicted equilibria, and the players’ behavior can disobey their presumed utility function. • the utility function and make it accurate? Sometimes hard to predict or to accurately model. • Faulty players can just become spontaneous or unwilling to follow a reasonable utility under a model. Hence it is attractive if an equilibrium has more robust properties against these inherent factors and can prevent potential irrational behavior of players. The Story

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • CoRR

دوره abs/1703.03262  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2017