Stochastic Asymmetric Blotto Games: Theory and Experimental Evidence
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider a model where 2 players compete for items having different common values in a Blotto game. Players have to decide how to allocate their budgets across all items. The winner of each item is determined stochastically. We analyze two payoff objectives: (i) players aim to maximize their total expected payoff and (ii) players maximize the probability of winning a majority value of all items. These two payoff objectives result in qualitatively different equilibrium behavior. We report the results of an experiment where the two payoff mechanisms are compared and we find strong support for the theoretical predictions.
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