A Bargaining Theory of Coercion∗

In coercive diplomacy, coercers have two basic objectives. First, they want to wrest the largest possible concessions from the target. Second, they want to win without having to pay the costs of war. Yet these two objectives are often in tension: demanding larger concessions carries a greater risk of war. Avoiding war, by contrast, may require backing down in defeat. How do coercers balance these competing pressures when deciding “how much” to demand? This chapter develops a simple model of crisis bargaining to evaluate the strategic choices faced by coercers. How do they weigh their desire for gains against the risk of war? How do power and information play into these calculations? The analysis generates two counterintuitive hypotheses that challenge conventional wisdom about coercion. First, greater military power emboldens coercers to make riskier demands, increasing the likelihood of failure. Second, the model demonstrates that coercers are motivated to attenuate their demands when the target’s resolve is high, thereby making success more likely. In other words, we are more likely to observe coercive success when the target is believed to be highly-resolved. Both insights underscore the importance of the magnitude of demands in the analysis of coercive bargaining.