On Strong Accessibility of the Core of TU Cooperative Game

A novel cooperative game between client and subcontractors based on technical characteristics

Large projects often have several activities which are performed by some subcontractors with several skills. Costs and time reduction and quality improvement of the project are very important for client and subcontractors. Therefore, in real large projects, subcontractors join together and form coalitions for improving the project profit. A key question is how an extra profit of cooperation amo...

Using the Core to Predict Coalition Formation

The main objective of this work is to use the defining principles of the core solution concept to determine not only payoffs but coalition formation. Given a cooperative transferable utility (TU) game, we propose two non-cooperative procedures that deliver a natural and non-empty core extension, the aspiration core (Cross 1967, Bennett 1983), together with the supporting coalitions it implies. ...

Extendable cooperative games

A (TU) cooperative game is extendable (Kikuta and Shapley, 1986) if every core allocation of each sub-game can be extended to a core allocation of the game. It is strongly extendable if any minimal vector in the upper core of any of its sub-games can be extended to a core allocation. We prove that strong extendability is equivalent to largeness of the core (Sharkey, 1982). Further, we character...

Analyzing the Impact of Service Accessibility Enhancement on Urban Energy Efficiency Based on GIS Network Analysis

The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension

A TU-game in characteristic function form generates a unique minimal dominant set. This set is non-empty. For a game with a non-empty core, the core and the minimal dominant set coincide; in this case the core is the smallest (for inclusion) set of outcomes that satisfies accessibility. For an abstract game, the minimal dominant set and Shenoy’s dynamic solution coincide.