Jacob T. Levy: Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom

Among political theorists there is a dispute over the status of ideal theory [see, for instance, Pennington (2011), Tomasi (2012)]. Ideal theory is characterized by its reliance on abstract arguments and thought experiments concerning questions such as: What is justice? or What rights do we owe each other? As such, ideal theory will always have a place in philosophy departments. However, recent critics argue that debates in political philosophy and political theory should be consistent with the insights of the social sciences, particularly economics and sociology. Levy belongs to the critics’ camp. He begins his excellent Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom with a deconstruction of purely theoretical accounts of how liberals should view the existence of distinct associations and communities within society. Such accounts are close to the hearts of many libertarians and classical liberals. The ‘‘utopia’’ sketched by Robert Nozick (1974) in Anarchy, State, and Utopia and the framework outlined by Chandran Kukathas (2003) in his Liberal Archipelago are based on the idea that individuals can sort themselves in such communities in order to provide governance and local public goods without reliance on coercion by the state. Under such theories, an individual’s freedom to enter into various voluntary groups confers legitimacy on the decisions and actions of these groups. As such, so long as these groups respect a formal right to exit, their actions are legitimate and cannot be overridden or violated by the state, even if their practices appear deplorable to a majority of the population. Levy is sympathetic to this pluralistic liberal vision. However, he is also sensitive to the problems that might arise in practice. He notes that not only might such groups impose illiberal rules on their members, but as a matter of sociological practice long-lived and successful institutions can constrain the freedom of their members. Exit rights might exist in theory, but may be extremely curtailed in reality if, for example, individuals are brought up as children in communities that severely restrict their educational choices. This tension