On the Rabin signature
نویسندگان
چکیده
Some classical Rabin signature schemes are exposed to forgery attacks. We propose some variants to counter this weakness.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- CoRR
دوره abs/1111.3602 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2011