Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Finite Perfect Information Extensive Games with Generic Payoffs
نویسنده
چکیده
In nite perfect information extensive (FPIE) games, backward induction (BI) gives rise to all pure-strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria, and iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies (IEWDS) may give di erent outcomes for di erent orders of elimination. Duggan recently posed several conjectures in an e ort to better understand the relationship between BI and IEWDS in FPIE games. One conjecture states that the unique BI strategy pro le in FPIE games with generic payo s is guaranteed to survive IEWDS when all weakly dominated strategies are eliminated at every round. This paper exhibits a counterexample to this conjecture. JEL classi cation numbers: C72
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