anaphors ∗

Following Schlenker (1999); Percus & Sauerland (2003b); Anand (2006), we assume the following semantics for attitude relations A:1 • A(λGλx′λw′ . p)(x)(w) = 1⇔ ∃G∀〈w′, x′〉 ∈ Ax . p(G)(x′)(w′) = 1 • 〈x′, w′〉 ∈ Doxx ⇔ x′ is an individual compatible with who x takes herself to be in w, and w′ is a world compatible with what x believes in w. • G is a variable over concept generators of type 〈e, 〈κ, e〉〉, with κ the type of centered worlds/contexts. For any G, attitude relation A, attitude holder x, world w, and any (shifted) context κ′ = 〈w′, x′〉 ∈ Ax , JG yiK ′ := ιy : R(x′)(w′)(y), with R a salient acquaintance relation constrained such that ιy : R(x)(w)(y) = g(i). • The idea behind G and the meaning postulate for A is to cash out Kaplan’s (1968) framework for de re attitudes in a (somewhat) compositional way.