Interactive unawareness
نویسندگان
چکیده
The standard state-spaces of asymmetric information preclude non-trivial forms of unawareness (Modica and Rustichini, 1994, Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini, 1998). We introduce a generalized state-space model that allows for non-trivial unawareness among several individuals, and which satisfies strong properties of knowledge as well as all the desiderata on unawareness proposed this far in the literature. JEL-Classifications: C70, C72, D80, D82.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 130 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2006