The problem with the Frege–Geach problem
نویسندگان
چکیده
I resolve the major challenge to an Expressivist theory of the meaning of normative discourse: the Frege–Geach Problem. Drawing on considerations from the semantics of directive language (e.g., imperatives), I argue that, although certain forms of Expressivism (like Gibbard’s) do run into at least one version of the Problem, it is reasonably clear that there is a version of Expressivism that does not.
منابع مشابه
Expressivism and Contrary-forming Negation
A well known challenge faced by any version of metaethical expressivism is to provide an adequate treatment of the so-called Frege-Geach problem. The task is to make sense of logically complex sentences like 'If I insulted the host then I ought to apologize', to do so by making sense of the states of mind such sentences would be used to express, and to preserve the validity of intuitively valid...
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